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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Well established and fundamental requirements of a legal description within a lease and
option to purchase real property are at issue in this appeal. This case does not raise matters of
t. 1
1--1 •
•
+::
suustant1a1
puu11c
1ntciest,
matters 01+ 1.1rst
1mpress1on, issues
0

0

•

+

Oi

.
.
1 •
const1tut1ona1
1ntcrprctat1on or
0

questions of validity of statutes or ordinances. On this appeal, the main issue for the Court is,
whether an option to purchase real estate, that makes references to a lease agreement, may
incorporate the description of the demised premises therein to satisfy the statute of frauds.

2.

Statement of the Facts

On November 7, 2014, the parties entered into a lease agreement for the property
identified as the Hoke Mobile Home Park (the "park"), which consisted of 14 mobile home lots
and 13 mobile homes situated on 1.96 acres of land, located at the street address of 16867
Portner Road in Nampa, Idaho (the "Lease"). (R. Vol. I, pp. 54-60). The demised premises are
identified in Paragraph 1 of the Lease:
1.
Demised Premises: The Lessor does hereby lease to the Lessee that certain
mobile home park, formerly known as Hoke Mobile Home Park, consisting of 14
mobile home lots, and 13 mobile homes, situated on 1.96 acres of land located at
16987 Portner Rd. in Nampa, ldaho together with the personal property as
Described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto.

(R. Vol. I, p. 54 ).
The 13 lots/mobile homes are similarly identified in Exhibit A of the Lease as follows:
Parcel Number: 72161000 0
Site Address: 16867 PORTNER RD TRLR 1, NAMPA, IDAHO
Owner Name: Miller Mildred Jean
Legal Description: 07-3N-2W NW HOKES TRLR 1 R25544000 0 1970 STARCRAFT
12X40 VIN 2838 TITLE B103062497
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(R. Vol. I, pp. 58-60). Thus, each of the mobile homes and lots are identified by the parcel
number of the home, site address, name of the owner of the mobile home, and legal description
of the lot, which includes a township range description, lot parcel number, trailer number, home
description, vin number, and title number for the home. Id.

months and $1,500.00 per month thereafter. The term of the Lease is five years, with an option to
renew for an additional five years. The Lease is signed by the parties. See Idaho Code § 9-503.
The Lease was contingent upon the signing of an option to purchase the demised
premises. (R. Vol. I, p. 56). This "Option to Purchase" (the "Option") was signed and exercised
on November 7, 2014. (R. Vol. I, p. 50). The Option granted the Appellant NeYada, Inc.
("NeYada") the right to purchase the demised premises, identified in the Option with the same

description as the demised premises in Paragraph 1 of the Lease:
That certain mobile home park known as Hoke Mobile Home park, consisting of
14 mobile home lots, and 13 mobile homes, as more fully described in Exhibit
"A" attached hereto.
(R. Vol. I, p. 61). Exhibit A of the Option reads: "07-3N-2W NW PORTNER SUB TX 2 IN LT
9,, TX 05292 & 05293 IN BLK 9" (R. Vol. I, p. 65).
The terms of the Option are clear: it must be exercised on or before November 7, 2019; if
exercised, the purchase price of the demised premises is $200,000.00, less a credit of $10.00 for
the option consideration and a credit of 94.5% of the monthly lease payments paid to the Seller
under the Lease.
NeYada exercised the Option on November 7, 2014, when it signed the Lease. (R. Vol. I,
pp. 49-51, 250). Under Paragraph 4 of the Option, the parties opened up escrow with Idaho
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Escrow. Id.; (R. Vol. I, p. 62). Marian was essentially carrying the note. The parties executed
escrow instructions. (R. Vol. I, pp. 49-51, 68-74). The escrow instructions provide for payments
of $800.00 from NeYada to Respondents (hereinafter "Marian"), to begin on December 15,
2014, on the agreed upon principal amount of $200,000.00. Id. Out of this amount, Marian's

balance from each months' rent payment. Id. The parties delivered the Lease and Option to Idaho
Escrow on November 7, 2014. Id. They also disclosed rent rolls for the current tenants and the
parties signed a breakdown of how the rents would be allocated for November-Marian owed
NeYada $1,610.00 for its share of November's rents. (R. Vol. I, pp. 50, 68, 75). NeYada made
payments to Idaho Escrow in the months of December 2014, and then in January 2015, and
February 2015. (R. Vol. I, p. 51).
On November 15, 2014, Marian turned over actual possession of the park. (R. Vol. I, pp.
250-251). She gave NeYada a bill of sale for the 1973 and 1979 mobile homes. (R. Vol. I, pp.
27-30). Marian also paid NeYada $1,610.00 for their prorated portion of November's rents. (R.
Vol. I, p. 50). She then signed the notice of past due lot rents showing the other tenants owing
money. (R. Vol. I, pp. 250-251 ). Ne Yada posted late notices and new leases on the doors of the
other tenants. Id. On November 17, 2014, NeYada opened new accounts, paid past-due taxes,
and registered the mobile homes in its name. Id. They then hired a property management
company for the park. Id. It even went through an unlawful detainer proceeding. See Canyon
County Idaho Case Number CV-2014-12883.

By the signing of the Lease and Option, the Defendant became the landlord to the
residents of the Home Mobile Home Park. (R. Vol. I, p. 51 ). Although Ne Yada was to pay rent
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to Marian, it would receive the monthly rentals from the tenants of the park. Id. However,
beginning in December of 2014, Marian instructed the tenants of the park to make payments
directly to her and not to NeYada. Id. This lawsuit ensued.

3.

Course of Proceedings

Marian filed suit on January 12, 2015, seeking to invalidate the Lease and the Option for
a number of reasons: statute of frauds, capacity to contract, undue influence, and fraudulent
misrepresentation. (R. Vol. I, pp. 7-13). NeYada answered on February 15, 2015, and sought to
enjoin Marian from accepting money from the tenants of the park. Id. at 37-80. NeYada also
counterclaimed against Marian for breaching both the Lease and the Option. Ne Yada also sought
a declaration that the Lease and Option were valid and enforceable. Id. at 40-45.
On February 27, 2015, NeYada moved for summary judgment. Id. at 81-92. NeYada
sought to dismiss Marian's claims that the Lease and Option were unenforceable under the
statute of frauds, that she lacked capacity to contract, and that NeYada exercised undue
influence. Id. A hearing date was set for March 26, 2015. Id. at 95.
Marian did not file a response until March 19, 2015-six days before the hearing. Id. at
99-149. Also, at this time, Marian filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration
that the Lease and Option were unenforceable under the statute of frauds. Id. Ne Yada moved to
strike Marian's affidavit and her memorandum in opposition as untimely under the rules.
However, on March 25, 2015, Marian requested an extension of time to file a response to
NeYada's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 181-184.
On March 26, 2015, the Court began the hearing by bringing counsel to its chambers. (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 5). The parties had a discussion about the case. Id. The Court allowed the parties to
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submit additional briefing on the issues of the sufficiency of the legal description in the Lease
and the Option before April 3, 2015. Id. at p. 4. However, the evidence was closed. Id. NeYada
was not given an opportunity to respond to the evidence put in the record by Marian on March
19, 2015. Both parties complied. (R. Vol. I, pp. 180-203).
The Court issued a Memorandum Decision on April 9, 2015. Id. at 207-215. It held:
The description of the land in the Option to Purchase is insufficient to satisfy the
statute of frauds. It is a partial legal description without city, county, or state.
The description contained in the Lease and Option to Purchase is not adequate;
the legal description for the subject property is much more extensive than the
brief legal descriptions contained in the two documents. The Option to
Purchase did not include the city, county, or state of the property in question;
there was no indication of the quantity, identity, or boundaries of the real
property. While the legal description attached to the option is the legal description
as listed on the county real property records, this is not sufficient to satisfy the
statute of frauds as set forth in Ray and Garner. The documents do not speak for
themselves, and therefore are inadequate pursuant to the requirements of the
statute of frauds. Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 100 P. 1052 (1909). The
description in both the Lease and the Option to Purchase is insufficient to satisfy
the requirements. Therefore, the contract is invalid and is void.
Id. at 212. 1 ( emphasis added). The Court entered Judgment that day. Id. at 218.

On April 13, 2015, NeYada moved to reconsider the district court's decision and to set
aside the Judgment. Id. at 220-230. Its central argument was that the Court did not correctly
apply the case of Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 200 P.3d 1174 (2009) and Allen v. Kitchen, 16
Idaho 133, 100 P. 1052 (1909). NeYada contends that because the Option referenced the Lease
and the Lease referenced the Option, they are together admissible to identify the quantity,
identity, and boundaries of the subject property.

1 NeYada is confused on why the district court determined that the "legal descriptions for the subject property is
much more extensive than the brief legal descriptions contained in the two documents." Presumably, the district
court made an implicit finding that the legal description referenced in the Complaint was the actual legal description
of the property. (R. Vol. I, p. 8). The record does not contain any evidence that the metes/bounds description in the
Complaint is in fact the location of the park on the ground.
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Marian defended the motion on the grounds that the Court's decision was valid, because
the Lease and the Option were to comprise a single transaction and that they cannot be severed.
Under the "single transaction" theory, because the Option was invalid, so too was the Lease. The
support for this position stemmed from the Idaho Federal District Court case of Magnolia
Enterprises, LLC v. Schones, CV-08-376NBL\V, 2009 WL 1658022 (D. Idaho June 11, 2009).
The Court agreed with Marian and ruled as follows on May 6, 2015:
Here, the Lease and the Option comprised a single transaction and the documents
cannot be severed from one another. Plaintiff and Defendant both assented to the
promises contained in the Lease and Option at the same place and at the same
time with the result that the group of promises contained in the Lease and the
Option constituted a single contract. The Option and Lease do not stand on their
own merit. Further, the Option to Purchase, as it must speak for itself, contained
only a partial legal description without city, county, or state, and is therefore
insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. As the Option is invalid under the
statute of frauds, the Lease is also invalid under the statute of frauds. Therefore,
both the lease and the option are unenforceable.

Id. at 265-266.
Even though the district court found that the Lease and Option compromised a single
transaction, it did not incorporate the legal descriptions from both documents to determine
whether the legal descriptions were together sufficient. Ne Yada timely filed a notice of appeal.

Id. at 276-278. After a hearing on the issue of attorney's fees and costs, the Court held that
NeYada was entitled to fees and costs. Id. at 302-308. NeYada timely appealed that decision. Id.
at 302-304.
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J.

Did the district court err by determining that the Option was unenforceable?

2.

Did the district court err by determining that the Lease was unenforceable?

3.

Did the district court err by failing to apply the doctrine of partial performance?

III.

4.

Did the trial court err in awarding attorney fees and costs to Marian?

5.

Should NeYada be awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal?

ARGUMENT
1.

Standard of Review for Appeal from Summary Judgment

An appeal from summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard a district court
uses when granting a motion for summary judgment. La Bella Vita, LLC v. Shuler, 353 P.3d 420
(2015). Under Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper if
"the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then
summary judgment should be granted. Id. In making this determination, "all disputed facts are
liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party." Id.
2.

Well Established Precedent Should Guide the Court

This case is governed by existing case law. This Court should adhere to precedent. When
there is controlling precedent in Idaho law, "the rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow it,
unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued
injustice." Miller v. Simonson, 140 Idaho 287, 289, 92 P.3d 537, 539 (2004) (citing Houghland
Farms, Inc v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)).

3.

The Trial Court Erred Concluding that the Legal Descriptions in the Option is
lnsuQicient as a Matter of Law

The district court made an erroneous finding contrary to well-settled Idaho law by ruling
that the legal description in the Option is insufficient as a matter of law. It failed to recognize
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that the Option incorporates extrinsic descriptions admissible to identify the property. It should
have found that an issue of fact exists as to whether the legal description identified in the Option
referred to ground that was identifiable either by the Option alone, or to extrinsic evidence that it
refers. Accordingly, this Court should overrule the trial court decision.
Idaho Code § 9-505 provides that contracts for the sale of real property arc "invalid,
unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party
charged or his agent." Idaho Code § 9-505(4). An option appears to be akin to a purchase and
sale agreement; therefore, it must contain a sufficient description of the property. Southern v.
Southern, 92 Idaho 180,438 P. 2d 925 (1968).
A legal description is sufficient if it contains a complete description of the property. A
description is complete if the "quantity, identity or boundaries of property can be determined
from the face of the instrument, or by extrinsic evidence to which it refers." Ray v. Frasure,
146 Idaho 625, 629, 200 P.3d 1174, 1178 (2009). (emphasis added). In essence, Idaho law is
such that, so long as the signed documents evidencing a contract make express reference to an
extrinsic document that contains a legal description, the parties executing the document are
bound by its terms.
In Frasure, the parties contracted for the sale of real property that they described in their
written contract as "2275 W. Hubbard Rd., City of Kuna, County of Ada, Idaho 83634." Id. at
626. Although the contract included a space for a legal description of the property, it was left
blank. No legal description was attached to the contract. The buyer was not able to complete the
contract and requested a few extra days to perform. Frasure informed the buyer that he did not
intend to perform under the contract and had relisted the property for sale. The original buyer
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sued to have its contract specifically performed. The district court found that Frasure had
breached his contractual duties to the original buyer.
On Frasure's appeal, the Court explained that a "description of real property must
adequately describe the property so that it is possible for someone to identify 'exactly' what
property the seller is conveying to the buyer." Id. at 629-230. The court also noted that "[a]
description contained in a deed will be sufficient so long as quantity, identity or boundaries of
property can be determined from the face of the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic evidence
to which it refers." Id. (quoting City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd., Co., 135
Idaho 239, 16 P.3d 915, 920 (2000)). The Court then held that, standing alone, a physical address
is not a sufficient description of property for purposes of the statute of frauds, as it gives no
indication of the quantity, identity, or boundaries of the real property to be sold. Id. at 639.
In this case, a description of the subject property can be determined from the face of the
Option and/or by reference to the Lease of which it refers. This is distinguishable from Frasure
where the legal description consisted of only a street address. The Option contains the following
language:
WITNESS ETH
That in consideration of that certain land lease, dated November i\ 2014,
between Kenneth W. Hoke & Marian G. Hoke and NeYada, Inc. and other good
and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby
acknowledged, the Seller hereby offers to sell and deliver to the Buyer, under the
terms and conditions set forth herein, the following property, to wit:
That certain mobile home park known as Hoke Mobile Home
Park, consisting of H_mobile home lots, and U_mobile homes, as
more fully described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
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3.
PURCHASE PRICE. Subject to the adjustments and pro rations
hereafter described, the purchase price to be paid by the Buyer to the Seller for the
purchase of the property is the sum of $200,000.00.
The Buyer shall receive credit for the option money consideration of Ten
Dollars ($10.00) toward the purchase price and down payment of Ten Dollars
($10.00) as well as credit for 94.5% of all monthly lease payments paid to Seller
under the separate Land Lease described above.
Exhibit "A"
07-3N-2W NW PORTNER SUB TX 2 IN LT 9,, TX 05292 & 05293 IN BLK 9

(R. Vol. I, pp. 122-126). (emphasis added).
The Option contains both a valid method of describing real property and references
admissible extrinsic evidence. The legal description attached to the Option is a township/range
legal description. This is a legally recognized method for identifying property. (R. Vol. I, p. 228).
Nonetheless, the district court determined that the lack of city, state, or, zip code rendered the
description invalid. However, the failure to include a zip code or street address does not render a
legal description void. Wake/am v. Hagood, 151 Idaho 688, 695, 263 P.3d 742, 749 (2011). The
issue, which the district court declined to determine, is what area does the legal description
describe on the ground? If the ground is identifiable without resort to inadmissible extrinsic
evidence, it is sufficient. The exercise of what dirt the legal description in the Option refers never
took place. Instead, the lower court summarily determined that the description in the Option was
invalid as a matter of law under Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 100 P. 1052 (1909), because it
did not include a city, state, or zip code. (R. Vol. I, p. 212).
The district court misapplied the decision of Kitchen. In Kitchen, the legal description
was deemed insufficient because there was no reference to any record or external or extrinsic
description from which a complete description could be had, and critically, to no natural object
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or permanent monument, nor to any well or generally known point, place or locality. Kitchen,
16 Idaho at 144, 100 P. 1052 at l 055 (1909). The Court in Kitchen, however, indicated that parol
evidence is admissible to apply a description, good on its face. Id. The Court held:
In the case at bar, there is no reference to any record or external or extrinsic
description from which a complete description could be had, and no natural object
or permanent monument is referred to in the wTiting, nor is any well and generally
known point, place or locality described or used as a tie. The evidence to be
introduced would not be that of identification of a description, good on its face,
but it would be for the purpose of supplying, completing and perfecting a
description on its face insufficient and incapable of application. The name of the
city, town or village, and also the county and state, must be supplied by
extrinsic evidence. If the writing contained anything from which the name of
the civil or political subdivision or municipality to which these tracts are
additions could be ascertained, then oral evidence would be admissible to
apply the description contained in the writing to the lands as marked and
bounded either by recognized legal subdivisions or by metes and bounds ..
The distinction, however, should always be clearly drawn between the admission
of oral and extrinsic evidence for the purpose of identifying the land described
and applying the description to the property and that of supplying and adding to a
description insufficient and void on its face.

Id. at 1055-1056, 143-144.
In this case, the Option refers to the Hoke Mobile Home Park. Under Kitchen, the
location of this "park" is admissible to identify the city, state, and/or county where the land is
situated, which everyone knew to be Nampa, Idaho as it was admitted by the Complaint and
Answer. (R. Vol. I, pp. 8, 38). Extrinsic evidence is admissible to identify the park. See e.g.

Lexington Heights Development, LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 284, 92 P.3d 526, 534
(2004) (extrinsic was admissible to identify structures described in the agreement). This would
be akin to locating a monument on the ground. See e.g. Thorn Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Smith, 137
Idaho 480, 485, 50 P.3d 975, 979 (2002). Thus, the location of the park is "admissible to apply
the description contained in the writing to the lands as marked and bounded."
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Additionally, the "TX" referenced in the legal description of the Option is commonly
known as the county's tax parcel number of section ground, similar to a lot in a platted
subdivision. The county tax records are thereby incorporated by reference. As addressed by the
Court in Frasure, a legal description is sufficient so long as quantity, identity, or boundaries of
property can be determined from the face of the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic

evidence to which it refers. Frasure, at 625. The county tax records are admissible to assist
with determining the location on the subject property. See e.g. Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho
430,435, 80 P.3d 1031, 1036 (2003) (citing City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd.,
Ca., 135 Idaho 239,244, 16 P.3d 915, 920 (2000); See also Haney v. Malka, 123 Idaho 132, 136137, 844 P.2d 1382, 1386-1387 (Ct. App.1992) (The property descriptions contained in a
Certificate of Sale and an IRS Deed, referring to tax parcel numbers, are sufficient to permit
persons to identify the exact property being conveyed, albeit by reference to records in the
County Assessor's office).
Finally, the Option references and thereby incorporates the descriptions contained within
the Lease. By reference to the Lease, the Option includes the following supplemental description
of the subject property:
1.
Demised Premises: The Lessor does hereby lease to the Lessee that certain
mobile home park, formerly known as Hoke Mobile Home Park, consisting of 14
mobile home lots, and 13 mobile homes, situated on 1.96 acres of land located at
16987 Portner Rd. in Nampa, Idaho together with the personal property as
Described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
15.

Miscellaneous: It is further agreed as follows:

( d)
Option Agreement: This Lease Agreement is subject to and
contingent upon the Lessor entering into a written agreement with NeYada, Inc.
giving them the right to purchase the subject property.
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Exhibit "A"
Parcel Number: [Parcel Number of Each Mobile Home]
Site Address: [Address including city and state for each lot]
Owner Name: [Each Owner's Name]
Legal Description: [Township Range Description, Lot Parcel Number, Mobile
Home Type, VIN Number, and Title Number for each property].
Additionally, the Lease references the parcel nun.1ber of each mobile home and of each
lot. This incorporates the County Assessor's records into the legal description of not only the
Lease, but the Option as well. Thus, in summary, the legal description of the Option includes the
following:
1.

A township/range description;

2.

The location of the Hoke Mobile Home Park, or Canyon County, Idaho;

3.

The county tax parcel records that were incorporated by reference;

4.

The site address of the subject properties;

5.

The County Assessor's records incorporated by reference using the parcel number
of the mobile home and of the lot on the ground;

The district court should have incorporated this information before summarily finding
that the description was insufficient as a matter of law. The district court, as argued by Ne Yada
in its motion to reconsider, needs more information before making a determination of whether
the legal description is invalid. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 28-30). This was the precise reason why Ne Yada
withdrew its summary judgment on the issue of the sufficiency of the legal description in the
Option. (R. Vol. I, p. 170). The district court should not have granted summary judgment in
favor of Marian and instead found that an issue of fact exists as to the location of the description
of the ground and the method that would be employed to locate it.
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Instead, on the motion to reconsider, the district court held that the Lease and Option
constituted a single transaction. If that is the case, then the legal descriptions for both documents
should have been jointly combined. All applicable information could be admitted to determine
the location on the ground of the subject property, an exercise that the district court did not
allow.
4.

The Trial Court Erred Concluding that the Legal Descriptions in the Lease is
Insufficient as a Matter of Law

Standing alone, the description of the demised premises identified in the Lease is
sufficient as a matter of law. To create a lease, "there must be a definite agreement as to the
extent and bounds of the property leased; second, a definite and agreed term; and third, a definite
and agreed price of rental, and time and manner of payment." Wing v. A1unns, 123 Idaho 493,
499, 849 P.2d 954 (Idaho App. 1992)(rev'd on other grounds).
In dispute in this case is the description of the demised premises. The Lease is not subject
to the same rigid requirements as a conveyance of real estate. Although the Lease is required to
be in writing under Idaho Code § 9-503, a lease requires less definition of the boundaries than
would be required for the sale of real estate. Id.
Nonetheless, the Lease contains a description sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds
under both the standard of a description required for a lease or an option to purchase. The Lease
contains a site address, reference to the Hoke Mobile Home Park, parcel numbers for the mobile
home and for the lot upon which it resides. It also contains an actual legal description with a
township and range description. Additionally, the Lease refers to the Hoke Mobile Home Park.
Combined, these are iegally sufficient for a lease as a matter of law.
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Notwithstanding, the trial court made an erroneous finding that this transaction comprised
a "single transaction" and that the Option and the Lease cannot be severed from each other. It
held that the Lease was void under the statute of frauds:
The intention of the parties to a contract is the primary factor in determining the
severability of contract clauses. Vance v. Connell, 96 Idaho 417, 420, 529 P.2d
1289, 1292 (197 4 ). If a contract contains separate lease and option clauses, each
with its own recitation of consideration, then the clauses could stand on their own
merits and, taken with the intention of the parties, can be severable. Id. Where the
parties assent to a group of promises as a single whole, the group of promises
constituted a single contract. Krasselt v. Koester, 99 Idaho 124, 126, 578 P.2d
240,243 (1978).
Here, the Lease and the Option comprised a single transaction and the documents
cannot be severed one from the other. Plaintiff and Defendant both assented to the
promises contained in the Lease and Option at the same place and at the same
time with the result that the group of promises contained in the Lease and the
Option constituted a single contract. The Option and the Lease do not stand on
their own merits ... As the Option is invalid under the statute of frauds, the Lease
is also invalid under the statute of frauds. Therefore, both the Lease and the
Option are unenforceable.
(R. Vol. I, pp. 265-266).

The Option recites that the Lease was partial consideration for the Option. Although the
Lease was contingent upon the execution of the Option, it was a separate document altogether.
Because the Lease and the Option are separate documents, each with separate consideration, and
not a single document with separate clauses, it falls outside the scope of Connell.
Regardless, the district court failed to recognize that the Lease and the Option incorporate
each other by reference. Whether severable or not, they are both valid and enforceable
documents pursuant to the doctrine of incorporation by reference. Or, if they are a "single
transaction," then the property descriptions apply mutually to both the Lease and the Option. The
description of property in the Lease is thus sufficient as a matter of law.
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5.

The doctrine of Partial Performance Removes the Lease and Option from the
Statute of Frauds

The district court also found that the doctrine of partial performance was inapplicable to
remove the Lease and Option from the statute of frauds, as follows:
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff turned over possession of the park to Defendant,
the Plaintiffs paid defend the pro rata portion of the November 2014 rent; and the
Plaintiff has accepted each and every lease payment from Defendant which have
been paid to escrow. Based on the facts presented, this court does not find the
performance equitable to avoid the strictures of the statute of frauds. Defendant's
payments into the escrow account were made after being notified by Plaintiffs
counsel that the agreements were not enforceable. Plaintiff, an elderly woman,
consulted with an attorney shortly after the closing in this case. Notice was sent to
Defendants within a reasonable time. The payments made for one (1) month of
required rents in respect to at least lasting five (5) years do not constitute fully or
even a substantial portion of the payments to be made under the agreements. Such
payments do not constitute part performance sufficient to take the matter outside
the statute of frauds. Simmons v. Simmons, 134 Idaho 824 827-28, 11 P.3d 20, 2324 (2000).
(R. Vol. I, pp 213-214). This decision is in error.
Under the doctrine of part performance, when an agreement to convey real property fails
to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds, the agreement may nevertheless be specifically
enforced when the purchaser has partly performed the agreement. Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho
824, 827, 11 P.3d 20, 23 (2000). What constitutes part performance depends upon the particular
facts of each case and the sufficiency of particular acts is matter of law. Id. Apparently, the most
important acts that constitute sufficient part performance are actual possession, permanent and
valuable improvements and these two combined. Id. The only relevant element in this case is
"actual possession."
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The doctrine of part performance is best understood as a specific form of equitable
estoppel. Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 20 P.3d
21 (Idaho App. 2001 ). The elements of equitable estoppel are:
(1) Conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material
facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are
otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those whid1 the party subsequently
attempts to assert; (2) intention, or at least expectation, that such conduct shall be
acted upon by the other party; (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real
facts. As related to the party claiming the estoppel, they are: (1) Lack of
knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in
questionf ;l (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; and (3) action
based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially. Tew v.
Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 53,480 P.2d 896, 899 (1971).

Id. at 26, 490.
In this case, "actual possession" of the park was given from Marian to Ne Yada on
November 15, 2014, after opening escrow with Idaho Escrow, with signatures, pursuant to the
Option. (R. Vol. I, pp. 250-251). This is performance by Marian causing NeYada to
detrimentally rely on her actions. She gave NeYada a bill of sale for the 1973 and 1979 mobile
homes, which were in her name. (R. Vol. I, pp. 27-30). She also paid NeYada $1,610.00, which
was NeYada's prorated share of November's rents. (R. Vol. I, pp. 50, 113). Marian then signed
the notice of past due lot rents showing the other tenants owing money. (R. Vol. I, pp. 250-251).
NeYada relied to its detriment. NeYada posted late notices and new leases on the doors
of the other tenants in the park. Id. They opened new accounts, paid the past-due taxes on the
mobile homes, and registered the mobile homes in its name. Id. They then hired a property
management company for the park and performed an eviction. Id. Further, NeYada made its
payments under the Lease. (R. Vol. l, p. 51 ). AH of these actions stem from Marian turning over
actual possession of the park. The only task remaining for Marian to complete was to sign the
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deed when Nation Star was fully paid under the terms of the escrow agreement. In other words,
there was almost complete performance by Marian. Under these circumstances, at a minimum,
an issue of fact exists as to whether partial performance precludes her from asserting the statute
of frauds as a defense.

6.

Because Judgment against 1VeYada should be vacated, the Court Should
Reverse the Judgment against NeYada for Costs and Attorneys' Fees

The district court entered a Judgment Regarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees against
NeYada in the amount of $15,662.02. (R. Vol. I, p. 300). This was based upon the district
court's finding that Marian was the "prevailing party". (R. Vol. I, p. 294). To the extent the
district court is reversed, Marian can no longer be considered the "prevailing party," and thus,
the award of costs and attorneys' fees should be vacated, and the matter remanded.
Moreover, the district court erred in awarding costs and fees to Marian. It determined that
"[e]ven where a contract is found unenforceable, the prevailing party may still recover attorney
fees pursuant to an underlying agreement." (R. Vol. I, p. 285). The district court cited to
Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldson, 149 Idaho 87, 94, 233 P.3d 118, 125 (2008).

As its authority on the issue, the Court in Haroldson cited to O'Connor v. Harger Const., Inc.,
145 Idaho 904, 188 P.3d 846 (2008), which held that "[e]ven though the contract was
unenforceable, it was a contract and had a severability clause, so the attorney fee provision is
capable of enforcement." Other cases holding that attorney's fees are appropriate when an
agreement is invalidated, are based upon the specific attorney's fees provision in the agreement.
See e.g. Hilbert v. Hough, 132 Idaho 203,207, 969 P.2d 836, 840 (Ct. App.1998).

In this case, the Option does not contain an attorney's fees provision. The district court
got around this issue by its finding that the Option and the Lease were a "single transaction." (R.
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Vol. I, p. 295). However, assuming its validity, the specific language of the Lease only
authorizes attorney's fees "[i]n the event Lessor or Leesee breach any of the terms of this Lease."
An award of attorney's fees was not authorized by the Lease because there has been no
determination of whether NeYada breached the Lease. Accordingly, even if Marian was
considered the prevailing party, it was error for the district court to award attorney's fees to her.
There is no "transaction" and no right to fees under the plain language of the Lease.
7.

~t?,fgA<!i~~/Ir1title(Ll<2 Attorney Fees on AppeaJJ!,yr,suant to JAR 41 and 12120(3)

On appeal, where there is a legal basis for a prevailing party to be awarded their attorney
fees, the Supreme Court may grant such fees. I.A.R. 41. In this case, fees and costs to Ne Yada
are appropriate because the matter involves a "commercial transaction:"
[I]n any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing
party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be
taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the
state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
This case involves the lease and sale of a mobile home park. The nature of this case is
commercial in nature. Moreover, should NeYada prevail, it would likewise request costs
pursuant to LA.R. 40.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Ne Yada requests the Court reverse the district court's decision
on summary judgment, vacate the judgment against Ne Yada, and remand the matter with
directions to the district court.
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